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STATEMENT SHOWING JURISDICTION OF APPELLATE COURT 
The purpose of this appeal is an attempt to reverse an award 
by the District Court of visitation of five grandchildren with 
their paternal grandparents. This Court has jurisdiction over 
this case under Utah Code Annotated Section 78-2a-3-(2)(i), 
specifically providing for appellate jurisdiction in the Court of 
Appeals in appeals over visitation issues, 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
Appellees do not disagree materially with Appellants 
Statement of Issues and applicable standards of review. 
Appellees wish to present one additional issue: That of 
attorney fees. The standard of review for this issue is governed 
by Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure 33, providing for the award 
of attorney fees in a frivolous appeal. 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTE 
The interpretation of Utah Code Annotated Section 30-5-2 is 
determinative of this case. Utah Code Annotated Section 30-5-2 
reads: 
"30-5-2 Visitation rights of grandparents and other 
immediate family members. 
"(1) The district court may grant grandparents and 
other immediate family members reasonable rights of 
visitation if it is in the best interests of the children." 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This is an action by Boyd and Beverly brought under Utah 
Code Annotated Section 30-5-2 to have a court order issued 
granting them more liberal visitation with their grandchildren. 
The issue was first heard by Commissioner Michael G. 
Alllphin on an Order to Show Cause for temporary visitation by 
Boyd and Beverly Campbell pending final disposition of the case. 
At this hearing held on March 18, 1993, the Commissioner granted 
temporary visitation, and defined the schedule for said 
visitation as (1) every other Saturday from 9:00 a.m. until 
Sunday in time for the children to attend church in their home 
LDS Ward, (2) reasonable telephone contact, (3) if this schedule 
interfered with any school or church activities or medical 
appointments, the child involved would not attend the visitation. 
Janet objected to the Commissioner's order pursuant to Utah Code 
of Judicial Administration 6-401. A hearing on this objection 
was heard by Judge Gordon J. Low on May 19, 1993. At this 
hearing, the parties entered into a Stipulation allowing Boyd and 
Beverly visitation essentially one day at some time every other 
week, and required that Boyd and Beverly make arrangements for 
this visitation by phoning Janet on Sunday or Monday of that 
week. After this Stipulation expired, the parties agreed to 
basically the same arrangement until the time of the hearing, 
which was held on September 17, 1993. At this hearing, evidence 
was proffered and arguments made. The testimony proffered and 
arguments made addressed the issues of the effect of the 
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visitation on the parent-child relationship (Janet and her 
children), and each party's desires regarding how that visitation 
ought to take place. Judge Gordon J. Low made a bench ruling 
giving Boyd and Beverly Campbell visitation according to a 
portion of the terms they requested in the Requested Visitation 
Schedule submitted by them at this hearing. 
This bench ruling was reduced to a written Order on October 
27, 1993. This order disposes of the only issue in the case, and 
is the final judgment of the Court. It is from that Order that 
Boyd and Beverly appeal to this court. 
RELEVANT FACTS 
Boyd and Beverly Campbell are the parents of Kelly Campbell. 
Kelly and Janet were husband and wife until his untimely death on 
August 1, 1991. Kelly and Janet have four children, Marc, 
Brennen, Wade, and Lorrin, and Janet was pregnant with a fifth 
child, Tannen, when Kelly was killed in a sky-diving accident. 
(R. p. 2, paragraphs 4, 5, and 6) When Kelly was alive, Boyd and 
Beverly did not enjoy a healthy and frequent family relationship 
with each other, contrary to Boyd and Beverly's Statement of 
Facts. (T. p. 25, lines 1-13) 
After Kelly's death, Janet attempted to maintain the 
relationship between her children and Boyd and Beverly. However, 
Boyd and Beverly's requests became more demanding and less 
considerate of Janet and the children's schedules and 
preferences. (T. p. 19 lines 7-24) 
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The Complaint filed in this case requests visitation that is 
very close to a schedule of visitation that would be awarded to a 
non-custodial parent. The Complaint requests visitation the 
second and fourth weekends of each month from 8:00 p.m., Friday, 
to 6:00 p.m., Sunday; some time during the school holidays such 
as Thanksgiving, Christmas, spring vacation and Memorial Day; 
some time with each child either the day before or the day after 
his birthday; and three weeks of summer visitation. 
A Motion for Order to Show Cause was also filed with Boyd 
and Beverly's Complaint. An Order to Show Cause was issued and a 
hearing on this Order was heard by Commissioner Michael G. 
Allphin on March 18, 1993. (R. 15) Janet was represented by 
Attorney Jack J. Molgard at that hearing. (R. 23) Commissioner 
Allphin entered an Order allowing Boyd and Beverly temporary 
visitation and defined the schedule for that temporary visitation 
as follows: (1) every other Saturday from 9:00 a.m. until Sunday 
in time for the children to attend church in their home LDS Ward, 
(2) reasonable telephone contact, (3) if this schedule interfered 
with any school or church activities or medical appointments, the 
child involved would not attend the visitation. (R. 23 and 24) 
Janet objected to this Temporary Order. (R. 28) At this 
point, Jack J. Molgard withdrew as Janet's attorney, and Dianne 
R. Balmain entered her appearance as Janet's counsel. (R. 33 and 
34) 
Although no answer was filed to Plaintiff's Complaint, no 
default was ever taken, and the matter proceded as though an 
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Answer had been filed denying all allegations contained there. 
Additionally, counsel for Janet recalls that it was Judge Low who 
brought up the fact that no answer had been filed in the in-
chambers conference with counsel following their arguments and 
proffers of evidence at the September 17, 1993 hearing. 
On March 18, 1993, a hearing on Janet's Objection to the 
Commissioner's Temporary Order was held before the Honorable 
Gordon J. Low. At this hearing, the parties entered into a 
Stipulation which essentially allowed Boyd and Beverly to 
exercise visitation for one day every other week by making 
arrangements through Janet on Sunday or Monday of that week. (R. 
37-38) This arrangement continued until the hearing on September 
17, 1993. 
On September 17, 1993, a review hearing was held before the 
Honorable Gordon J. Low. (R. p. 74, T. p. 2, lines 4-7 and 19-
23. It was the intent of both parties that the Court's ruling in 
that hearing would effect a total resolution of all of the issues 
of the case. (T. p. 2, lines 24-25, p. 3, lines 1-3) 
Counsel for both parties felt that the presentation of 
evidence through testimony would further exacerbate the already 
strained relations of the parties. Thus counsel proffered their 
evidence and then presented arguments to the Court. (T. p. 3, 
lines 4-13) 
At this hearing, Boyd and Beverly presented a Requested 
Visitation Schedule to the Court. (R. p. 72 and 73) A copy of 
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this Requested Visitation Schedule is attached to the Addendum 
marked as Exhibit "A". 
At the conclusion of counsels' proffers and argument, the 
Court held an off-the-record hearing with both counsel in 
Chambers. (T. 26, lines 20-23) Then the Court interviewed two 
of the grandchildren off the record in Chambers. (T. p. 27, 
lines 1-3) 
At the request of Boyd and Beverly's counsel, the Court then 
reiterated much of its discussion with counsel in chambers. (T. 
p. 27 lines 12-13) The Court stated that it believed that 
healthy family relationships, and extended family relationships 
are a basis of our societal relationships, and that public policy 
encourages the facilitation of these relationships. (T. p. 27, 
lines 15-21) The Court then stated that it had some strong 
concerns regarding the constitutionality of the statute at issue, 
as it may allow an eroding or compromising of the parental 
authority in relationship with the children, and that this 
relationship is not just constitution, but fundamental. (T. p. 
27, lines 21-25, p. 28 lines 1-3) The Court explained that the 
right of a parent to have discretion relative to the raising of a 
child is quite fundamental and should be invaded only when a 
parent is found to be absolutely unfit and the parent's influence 
on the children expose the children to unreasonable danger. (T. 
p. 28, lines 12-18) The Court explained that parents have great 
discretion in the raising of their children, but also have great 
responsibility. (T. p. 29 lines 16-19) 
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The Court further explained that the relationship of 
grandchildren and grandparents is influenced in large measure by 
the relationship of the parents and grandparents, and that the 
statute at issue was ont meant to provide to grandparents a 
vested right of visitation. (T. p. 29 lines 11-15, and p. 30, 
lines 7-9) The Court found that the grandparents have to defer 
to the parents almost exclusively, and the fact that the father 
of these children is deceased does not change that finding. (T. 
page 31, lines 2-5) The Court then issued a bench ruling which 
Attorney Balmain was directed to reduce to writing. The Court 
signed this Order on October 27, 1993, after it was submitted but 
never signed approved as to form by Attorney Hoggan. (R. 79-82) 
A copy of the Order from which Boyd and Beverly appeal is 
attached to the Addendum and marked as Exhibit "B". 
The Court's September 17, 1993 Order granted Boyd and 
Beverly the following visitation schedule: 
2. One (1) evening on the day before or after each 
child's birthday from 4:00 p.m. to 8:00 p.m. if the birthday 
occurs during the school year, and until 8:30 p.m. if the 
birthday occurs when school is not in session. 
3. One (1) day during the Christmas holidays. 
4. One-half (1/2) day during the Thanksgiving holiday. 
5. The time and duration of the Campbell family 
reunion, provided that the Defendant/Mother is also invited 
to attend. 
6. Once per month from 4:00 p.m. until 8:00 p.m. with 
one child of the Plaintiffs' choice for purposes of 
development of a one-on-relationship with that child. 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The Constitutionality of the statute 30-5-2 was properly 
before the Court for adjudication, as after the parties' 
stipulations, only legal issues remained for the Court to decide. 
Janet stipulated that some visitation of Boyd and Beverly with 
the children was in the children's best interests, thereby 
removing the major factual issue from the case. Further, Janet 
stipulated to a schedule for some visitation to take place, 
thereby removing the remaining issue. Had the trial court ruled 
on the legal issues before taking the parties' stipulations, 
there would have remained no factual issues to be decided. The 
determination of legal issues is precisely the function of the 
trial court, which function it properly fulfilled in this case. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT ONE 
THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF UTAH CODE ANNOTATED 30-5-2 WAS 
PROPERLY BEFORE THE COURT FOR ADJUDICATION. 
The Complaint in this case is based on Utah Code Annotated 
Section 30-5-2, which states: 
"30-5-2 Visitation rights of grandparents and other immediate 
family members. 
"(1) The district court may grant grandparents and 
other immediate family members reasonable rights of 
visitation if it is in the best interests of the children." 
Janet does not dispute the fact that the Constitutionality 
of this provision was never raised by either party or their 
counsel, but was raised by the Court sua sponte. No state 
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statute or legal principle prohibits any trial court from raising 
a legal or factual issue in this manner• 
Appellants seem to assert that because the issue here is 
visitation rather than custody, constitutional concerns should 
never have come into play. However, when a the rights as a 
parent are impinged upon through a court order requiring that she 
allow another person to become involved in her children's lives, 
a constitutional issue is raised. Other state courts have so 
held. See, Hawk v.Hawk, No. 03S01-9201-CV-00013, Tennessee 
Supreme Court (1993); Shriver v. Shriver, (1966) 7 Ohio App. 2d 
169, 36 Ohio Ops 2d 308, 219 NE2d 300; See also, 90 A.L.R. 3rd 
222, Grandparent Visitation Rights 
A. THE COURT APPLIED THE PROPER STANDARD TO BOYD AND 
BEVERLY CAMPBELL'S ACTION FOR VISITATION RIGHTS WITH 
THEIR GRANDCHILDREN. 
Boyd and Beverly argue that the trial court applied an 
incorrect standard in that it ordered what the parent would agree 
to by way of visitation, and not what visitation order was in the 
best interests of the children. 
However, the trial court specifically states that it finds 
that "visitation with these grandparents and the grandchildren is 
beneficial and in the best interest and welfare of the children 
and therefore should be granted." (T. page 30, lines 12-16) 
Further, the Court ordered the specific visitation that was 
agreed to by the parent, Janet, in this case, as a matter of 
confirming the stipulation. It should be noted that Janet agreed 
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that some form of visitation is in the best interests of the 
children. (T. p. 3f lines 21-25, and p. 19, lines 5-7) It could 
be said that Janet stipulated to the fact that visitation of some 
form was in the best interest of the children, but had some 
dispute regarding the specifics of how that visitation was 
carried out. 
Boyd and Beverly also seem to argue that they did not enter 
into any stipulation regarding their requested visitation 
schedule. They seem to argue that if they could not be awarded 
the entire schedule they requested, they would not stipulate to 
any part of it. The reasonableness of this position in this type 
of litigation, where precious relationships with children are at 
issue seems highly inappropriate. 
The case cited by Boyd and Beverly, Ehrlich v. Ressner 
(1977) 55 App. Div. 2nd 953, 391 NYS 2d 152, is particularly 
instructive in this case where a trial judge's denial of a 
maternal grandfather's petition to secure visitation rights was 
reversed. The facts are somewhat similar in that one of the 
grandchildren's parents being deceased. The Court in that case 
also had an off-the-record discussion with the children. Here, 
the Court had an off-the-record discussion with two of the 
children, now ages 12 and 10. There, the children were all teen-
aged, and likely more able to articular their desires. 
Boyd and Beverly would have this Court believe that the case 
is exactly similar. However, here the trial court did not base 
its decision on its off-the-record discussion with the children. 
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The trial judge merely pointed out that he found the discussions 
"very informative." (T. p. 27, line 3, page 32, lines 2-16) He 
further pointed out that the children "had not been coached" nor 
directed to what they should tell him. (T. p. 32, lines 5-16) 
It is noteworthy that the children here did not say that they 
were "busy" and "did not want to feel compelled to maintain any 
specific visitation" as was the case in Ehrlich. 
The statute in issue in the Ehrlich case provided for the 
specific situation here, where a parent of a minor children is 
deceased, which circumstance our statute does not specifically 
provide for. However, the two statutes are similar in that each 
provides for the court to secure visitation privileges "as the 
best interests of the child may require". Ehrlich 
The fact that our statute does not provide for the specific 
situation of one deceased parent cannot go unnoticed. Basic 
rules of statutory interpretation would require that we not make 
a special rule for the situation of the death of one parent, 
where the legislature has seen fit to cover all situations with 
one rule, and has stated that we should be guided by the best 
interests of the children. It would appear that the legislature 
has considered the concept engendered by the New York statute, 
which is that the parents of the deceased parent to the children 
at issue essentially take the place of that parent with regard to 
a visitation schedule, and found that this option did not serve 
the interests of the people of the State of Utah. 
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The Court in Ehrlich stated that "by having enacted this 
statute, the legislature implicitly recognized that visits with 
grandparents are often a precious part of a child's experience," 
The Court further stated that "although control over visitation 
rests within the sound discretion of a trial judge, the judge 
must be guided by the humanitarian purposes of the statute and by 
an independent evaluation of the best interest of the children." 
Judge Low nearly duplicated this language in his statement 
to parties and counsel when he said "I think there's nothing 
better than a wonderful, warm, healthy family relationship 
between grandparents and grandchildren; in fact, extended family. 
I think it's a basis of our societal relationships and I think 
it's wonderful and healthy and ought to be encouraged and I think 
public policy does." (T. p. 27 lines 15-21) Further, the Court 
heard proffers of evidence from both counsel regarding the 
effects of visitation on the children. The trial court also held 
an off-the-record discussion with two of the children involved. 
The parties essentially stipulated that some visitation 
would be in the best interests of the children, as the Court's 
first question to counsel for Janet reflects. (T. p. 3, lines 
17-25) The Court also specifically found. (T. p. 30, lines 12-
18) 
B. THE COURT'S VIEWS ON THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THIS 
STATUTE DID NOT COLOR ITS DECISION IN THIS MATTER. 
The Court's views regarding the Constitutionality of the 
statute did not color its decision in this matter. Since Janet 
essentially stipulated the fact that some visitation of Boyd and 
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Beverly with the children would be in their best interests, and 
then stipulated to a schedule for such visitation, the fact that 
the Court felt that the statute was unconstitutional became a 
moot point. The only possible effect the Court's view of the 
Constitutionality of the statute could have had would have been 
that Boyd and Beverly would have been granted no visitation 
whatsoever. 
Further, the issue of bias or prejudice in the trial court, 
or any matter not put in issue before the trial court, may not be 
raised for the first time on appeal. James v. Preston, 746 P.2d 
799, 801 (Utah App. 1987) Appellants seem to be asking for a new 
judge, one without the bias on the Constitutionality of this 
statute, on remand. To do so, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, 
Rule 63(b) requires that they have first filed an affidavit in 
the trial court. They have not complied with this requirement, 
and are raising the issue for the first time on appeal. 
POINT TWO 
THE TRIAL COURT'S FINDINGS ADEQUATELY EXPLAIN THE BASIS FOR 
ITS DECISION. 
Utah Code Annotated provides for grandparent visitation when 
the district court finds that it is in "the best interest of the 
children." Boyd and Beverly argue that the trial Court "never 
did find that visitation would not be in the best interest of the 
children." Appellant's Brief, page 13 The Court's findings, as 
memorialized by counsel for Janet, do state specifically: 
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1. Some visitation of the children by the Plaintiffs 
will be beneficial and in the best interests and well-being 
of the children," Order, R. p. 79-82, emphasis added 
(attached hereto as Exhibit "B") See also, T. p. 
Boyd and Beverly argue that the Court's findings in this 
case do not meet the standards required by the Utah Supreme Court 
and the Utah Court of Appeals, because the findings do not 
provide adequate facts and data for the Court of Appeals to find 
the that the trial court's decision was rationally based. Sukin 
v, Sukin, 842 P.2d 922 Utah App. 1992 They also argue that the 
trial courts findings are also inadequate because they do not 
provide "a logical and legal basis for the ultimate conclusions." 
Milne Truck Lines v. Public Service Commission, 720 P.2d 1373 
(Utah 1986) A simple review of the trial court's findings shows 
that they are rational and logical, one following from another, 
explaining the basis for the Court's determination that the 
statute was not Constitutional: The parent-child relationship is 
the primary relationship to be enhanced, therefore the 
grandparents must defer to the parent. The children have 
suffered as a result of the fact that this has not happened and 
this litigation has taken place. (R. 79-82) The Court goes 
through this analysis forwards and then backwards, in an effort 
to explain the basis for its decision to all the parties 
involved. The Court's legal reasoning was provided in step-by-
step fashion. 
Boyd and Beverly argue that the findings are not 
sufficiently detailed and do not include enough subsidiary facts 
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to disclose the steps by which the ultimate conclusion on each 
factual issue is based." Smith v. Smith, 726 P.2d 423 (Utah 
1986) Janet essentially stipulated that some visitation with 
Boyd and Beverly was in the children's best interests, thus 
removing the major issue from the case. The particular facts 
surrounding how that visitation should take place were then the 
only remaining issue. Janet further stipulated to some 
visitation. These two stipulations removed any factual issue 
from the purview of the Court. The only remaining issue then, 
was legal. The Court very adequately explained the basis for its 
legal decision. 
Boyd and Beverly argue that the findings of fact "are not 
findings of fact at all." Appellant's Brief, page 17 "There is 
no finding of fact by the Court to lead to its conclusions other 
than the fact that Janet agreed to some visitation...." The 
Court did base its decision on its finding that visitation was in 
the best interests of the children, to which fact and finding 
Janet also stipulated. It is conceivable that the Court could 
have ordered that no visitation take place, had Janet not 
stipulated to any. However, as argued above, there is no rule 
prohibiting a trial court from raising an issue sua sponte. 
Boyd and Beverly allege that "Finding No. 1 does not 
articulate why or what visitation will be in the best interest 
and well-being of the children." Janet stipulated to this fact, 
therefore the Court need not make any specific findings thereon. 
Further, the trial court did explain the basis for its decision 
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that generally extended family relationships are to be encouraged 
and fostered. (T. p. 27, lines 18-21) 
Boyd and Beverly also argue that "Finding No. 2 is not a 
finding of fact at all, but rather a conclusion of law that a 
constitutional right of Defendant/Mother is impinged upon by 
Section 30-5-2. The purported finding does not articulate how or 
in what way, in the context of this case, a constitutional and 
fundamental right of Defendant/Mother is impinged upon or even 
what that 'constitutional and fundamental' right to be protected 
against the claims of Boyd and Beverly may be." The Court in its 
bench ruling did, however, state that "the right of a parent to 
have discretion relative to the raising of a child is about as 
fundamental a right as we can find." (T. p. 28, lines 12-14) 
Appellants state that "Finding No. 3 is not a finding of 
fact either, but rather is a vague preachment of a parent's legal 
responsibility. It does not articulate any fact from which the 
Court could conclude in this case that visitation with the 
grandchildren was not in the grandchildren's best interest." 
Finding No. 3 does state the logical basis for the Court's 
conclusion that the statute impinges upon a Constitutional right. 
Boyd and Beverly argue that "Finding No. 8 finds that Janet 
stipulated to the visitation granted by the Court. It does not 
find Bovd and Beverly stipulated to the same visitation." This 
argument seems to imply that if Boyd and Beverly couldn't have 
the entire schedule they requested in their "Requested Visitation 
Schedule", they did not want or would not take anything at all. 
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The issue before the trial court was would grandparent 
visitation be in the best interests of the grandchildren and, if 
so, to what extent. The Court's findings here state that "some 
visitation would be in the best interests...of the children." 
(T. p. 3, lines 14-22). As to some of Boyd and Beverly's 
specific requests, the Court specifically found those not to be 
in the best interests of the children. For example, the Court 
stated that it would not order weekend visitation because it did 
not find it to be in the best interest and welfare of the 
children. (T. p. 33, lines 8-10) See also, T. p. 34, lines 10-
17, p. 35, lines 5-9) 
A. GRANDPARENT VISITATION IN THIS CASE HAS NOT BEEN 
"VIRTUALLY PROHIBITED". 
Boyd and Beverly assert that "[t]he visitation Order limits 
the time Boyd and Beverly can have visitation with all of the 
grandchildren at the same time to one day during the Christmas 
holiday, one-half day during the Thanksgiving holiday, and the 
Campbell family reunion if Janet is invited. This is a total of 
two and one-half (2-1/2) days per year." Boyd and Beverly assert 
that this limitation is "wholly unreasonable" and gives them 
"virtually no time to visit with all of the grandchildren at the 
same time and establish family rapport." At no time has Janet 
argued that her children ought not develop a healthy and warm 
relationship with their paternal grandparents. However, the 
proctocolitis of the situation dictate that a predetermined 
schedule allowing visitation with all five (5) children, ranging 
in age from two (2) to twelve (12) is nearly impossible. These 
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are boys who are each involved in various combinations of the 
following activities: Scouting, piano lessons, soccer, Little 
League, and 4-H (horses), in addition to school and church 
activities as well as various household responsibilities. 
Janet has wisely determined that the opportunities afforded 
through these activities for educational, social and emotional 
growth are important to the children's well-being. This clash 
between the children's activity schedule as determined by their 
remaining living parent and the desires of their paternal 
grandparents is exactly the place that Constitutional 
considerations emerge. The trial court stated that the primary 
relationship with which public policy is concerned is the parent-
child relationship. (T. p. 36, lines 3-13) Where the 
grandparent-grandchild relationship begins to interfere with this 
relationship, a parent's Constitutional rights are raised. 
Further, Boyd and Beverly argue that "those portions of the 
Order allowing visitation only with one child at a time may well 
have the effect of dividing the children in their relationship 
with Boyd and Beverly." However, this portion of the Order was 
taken directly from Boyd and Beverly's Requested Visitation 
Schedule, item 8, attached hereto as Exhibit "A". 
Prior to Kelly's death, the children visited with Boyd and 
Beverly approximately once per month, usually as a family, with 
the exception of the time on extended vacations that Boyd and 
Beverly spent. Were it not for the strained relations engendered 
by this litigation, it is possible that this schedule may have 
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continued. (T. page 25, lines 3-7) It is also important to note 
that these children have another set of grandparents, Janet's 
parents, with whom they also need time to develop a relationship. 
The statute also allows other immediate family members to 
petition the district court for visitation. See, Utah Code 
Annotated Section 30-5-2. These children have six maternal aunts 
and one paternal uncle and one paternal aunt, in addition to 
spouses of these aunts and uncle and cousins. 
If Boyd and Beverly were awarded their Requested Visitation 
Schedule, many of the other relatives would also be required to 
petition the Court to get their fair time with the children. It 
is obvious that Janet must have the discretion to control the 
children's activities and involvements so that she is afforded 
the opportunity of exercising her full rights and duties as the 
childrens' parent. 
The scheduled requested by Boyd and Beverly is not 
altogether different from that given by the legislature in 
Section 30-3-5 of the Utah Code, defining Minimum Guidelines for 
Visitation. Boyd and Beverly's Requested Schedule asks for time 
around major holidays, significant time in the summer, birthdays 
and alternating weekends. The inappropriateness of this much 
time is obvious when one considers that their relationship to the 
children is one of grandparents rather than parents. 
POINT THREE. 
JANET SHOULD BE AWARDED ATTORNEY FEES IN RESPONDING TO THIS 
APPEAL. 
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Pursuant to Utah Code Annotated Section 78-27-56, in any 
civil action the court shall award reasonable attorney's fees to 
a prevailing party if the court determines that the action or 
defense was without merit and not brought or asserted in good 
faith. Utah Rule of Appellate Procedure, Rule 33 further states 
"if the court determines that a motion made or appeal taken under 
these rules is either frivolous or for delay, it shall award just 
damages, which may include single or double costs and/or 
reasonable attorney fees, to the prevailing party," 
Utah Rule of Appellate Procedure, Rule 33 defines "frivolous 
appeal" as "one not grounded in fact, nor warranted by existing 
law, or not based on a good faith argument to extend, modify or 
reverse existing law." Janet would argue that Boyd and Beverly's 
appeal is frivolous for the reason that they did receive the 
relief they requested at the trial court level: Visitation with 
their grandchildren. Further, they were receiving this even 
before their court action. Janet had stipulated to the fact that 
visitation was in the best interests of the children, and that 
visitation was occurring. 
Boyd and Beverly's dissatisfaction over the visitation was 
not with the time or the frequency, as their past pattern of 
involvement would show. (They took frequent extended vacations 
and prior to Kelly's death only had contact with the children 
approximately once per month.) Their dissatisfaction over the 
visitation was caused by the fact that Janet would not allow them 
to take any or all of the children at any time and to any place, 
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without her knowledge of where they were going, what they were 
doing, or when they would return. Janet submits that this is not 
a right that is granted to them under the statute, or which they 
could reasonably expect to be granted them by this Court or any 
other, because of the Constitutional nature of her right as a 
parent. It appears that the litigation here was intended to be 
used as economic blackmail to strengthen Boyd and Beverly's hand 
in the battle to have control and influence over the children. 
There is little question but that Boyd and Beverly's financial 
situation is much better than Janet's, who is trying to raise 
five boys on the Social Security income she receives from Kelly's 
death. 
Counsel for Janet has attached an Affidavit for Attorney 
Fees as Exhibit "C" to this Brief. 
CONCLUSION 
The stipulations of the parties disposed of the factual 
issues in this case, thereby leaving only legal issues for 
decision. The Court's decision and findings adequately explain 
the basis for its decision on the legal issue, constitutionality. 
There is nothing to prohibit the Court from raising this issue 
sua sponte. Had the trial court ruled on the legal issues before 
taking the parties' stipulations, there would have remained no 
factual issues to be decided—Appellants would have come out with 
no stipulation from Janet, and would currently be having no 
visitation at all. The determination of legal issues is 
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precisely the function of the trial court, which function it 
properly fulfilled in this case. * 
Respectifully submitted this ' CJ day of May, 1994. 
Dianne R. Balma4.it 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellee 
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PROOF OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that I mailed four (4) exact copies of the 
foregoing Brief of Appellees to Appellant's attorney, L. Brent 
Hoggan, OLSON & HOGGAN, 88 West Center Street, P.O. Box 525, 
Logan, Utah 84323-0525 this 18th day of May, 1994. 
Dianne R. Balmam 
ADDENDUM 
Dianne R. Balmain - 6175 
Attorney for Defendant 
110 North 100 East 
P.O. Box 543 
Logan, Utah 84323-0543 
Telephone: (801) 753-7400 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT FOR THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT, 
COUNTY OF CACHE, STATE OF UTAH 
BOYD & BEVERLY CAMPBELL, * 
ORDER 
Plaintiff, * 
vs. * 
JANET C. CAMPBELL, * Case No. 934-054 
Defendant. * 
THIS MATTER came on for hearing before District Judge Gordon 
J. Low in Logan, Cache County, Utah, on Defendant's Objection to 
the Order on Order to Show Cause held March 18, 1993, continued 
from May 18, 1993 and July 27, 1993 by stipulation of the parties. 
By agreement of the parties, this Order will effect a final 
resolution of Plaintiff's Verified Complaint, dated January 26, 
1993. 
The Plaintiffs were present in person and were represented by 
their Attorneys, Olson & Hoggan, P.C., L. Brent Hoggan. The 
Defendant was present in person and was represented by her 
Attorney, Dianne R. Balmain. Counsel for each of the parties made 
proffers of testimony and statements to the Court of their 
respective clients' positions, and the Court having talked with the 
two older children that are the subject of this action, MARC 
CAMPBELL and BRENNAN CAMPBELL privately in chambers, and having 
€©p 
examined the file and having heard the statements of counsel and 
being fully advised in the premises, the Court hereby makes and 
enters the following: 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAN 
1. Some visitation of the children by the Plaintiffs will 
be beneficial and in the best interests and well-being of the 
children. 
2. A Constitutional and fundamental right of the 
Defendant/Mother is impinged upon the statute, § 30-5-2. 
3. Parents have great discretion with regard to the parent-
child relationship. In addition to a duty of support for their 
children, parents have all legal responsibility for decisions 
affecting their children. The parent-child relationship is the 
only relationship given constitutional consideration in our 
society. 
4. The statute § 30-5-2 was not intended to provide a vested 
right of visitation in grandparents. The statute provides the 
court with discretion to order visitation when and if appropriate. 
5. This litigation by the Plaintiffs has been detrimental 
to the children, who have suffered and may continue to suffer. 
6. The grandparents have to defer to Defendant/Mother's 
decisions in this relationship. The fact that the father is 
deceased does not change this. 
7. The parent-child relationship is the primary relationship 
that should be enhanced. Further, it is in the interest of public 
2 
policy to enhance this relationship by deferring to reasonable 
decisions by the parent. 
8. The Defendant/Mother has stipulated that the following 
is appropriate and reasonable visitation with the Plaintiffs, and 
the court so finds. 
ORDER 
The Plaintiffs shall have the following visitation with their 
grandchildren, Marc, Brennan, Wade, Lorrin, and Tannen Campbell: 
1. The Defendant will make a reasonable effort to inform the 
Plaintiffs of all significant church, school and recreational 
activities. The Court realizes that this may not be possible in 
every circumstance, and that it may not always be in the best 
interests of the children for the mother to so inform the 
Plaintiffs. 
a. Visitation should not interfere with or override 
these activities, unless the Defendant/Mother determines that it 
is in the best interests of the children. 
b. The children's desires regarding the presence of 
others at these activities and events should be considered. 
2. One (1) evening on the day before or after each child's 
birthday from 4:00 p.m. to 8:00 p.m. if the birthday occurs during 
the school year, and until 8:30 p.m. if the birthday occurs when 
school is not in session. 
3. One (1) day during the Christmas holidays. 
4. One-half (1/2) day during the Thanksgiving holiday. 
3 
5. The time and duration of the Campbell family reunion, 
provided that the Defendant/Mother is also invited to attend. 
6. Once per month from 4:00 p.m. until 8:00 p.m. with one 
child of the Plaintiffs' choice for purposes of the development of 
a one-on-one relationship with that child. 
DONE in open Court the 17th day of September, and signed this 
& I day of-September, 1993. 
S/GORDONJ.LOW 
Gordon J. Low 
District Court Judge 
Approved as to form: 
L. Brent Hoggan 
OLSON & HOGGAN 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
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RNEYS AT LAW 
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)NTON OFFICE 
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L. Brent Hoggan (#1512) 
OLSON & HOGGAN, P. C. 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
88 West Center 
P. 0. Box 525 
Logan, Utah 84323-0525 
Telephone: (801) 752-1551 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF UTAH, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CACHE 
BOYD CAMPBELL and BEVERLY 
CAMPBELL, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
JANET C. CAMPBELL, 
Defendant. 
BOYD AND BEVERLY CAMPBELLS' 
REQUESTED VISITATION SCHEDULE 
Civil No. 934000054 
Boyd and Beverly Campbell (Campbells) request the following 
visitation with their grandchildren, issue of Kelly and Janet 
Campbells 
/ 1 , One (1) twenty-seven (27) hour period every other week, 
preferably from 6:00 p.m. Friday night to 9:00 p.m. on Saturday 
night. If the children have church, school or recreational 
activities or music lessons during this time, Campbells will see 
that the children involved attend all such activities. 
2. One (1) evening on the day before or after each child's 
birthday ip&& 4:00 p.m. to 8v*K) p.m. during the schoo^ year and 
until 9^00 p.m. when school is not in session. 
Father's Day from 9:00 a.m. until 6:00 p. 
Three ^3) days during the Christmas holidays 
One (1) day during the Thanksgiving holiday from 9:00 a.m 
until9:00 p.m. l/? &&V\ 
(&J- One 
The 
1 fa] & ll>f 
7 . reunions time ?md aurfati<pif of Campbells' family reu 
8. Once per month from 4:00, p.m. until 8:00 p.m. with one 
child of Campbells' choice f6r purposes of a one-on-one 
relationship with that child. ' 
In addition to the foregoing, Campbells would like the older 
children to work at odd jobs provided by Boyd Campbell during the 
summer for the purpose of assisting Janet in teaching the children 
a strong work ethic and as a way of providing money to the children 
earned through their own effort, for school, recreation and savings 
purposes• 
The Campbells also ask that they be given at least one (1) 
week's notice of the dates each child will receive church 
ordinances such as baptisms and priesthood ordinations and of the 
children's participation in school, church and sporting type events! 
and the right to attend any such events. 
DATED this 17th day of September, 1993. 
Respectfully submitted, 
OLSON & HOGGAN, P.C. 
(W 
L. Brent Hoggan 
Attorneys for P la in t 
U^r~^ 
utf* 
& HOGGAN, P.C. 
DRNEYS AT LAW 
WEST CENTER 
• O. BOX 525 
UTAH 84323-0525 
31) 752-1551 
ONTON OFFICE 
23 EAST MAIN 
'.O. BOX 1 15 
<<TON, UTAH 84337 
01) 257-3885 
CERTIFICATE OF HAND DELIVERY 
I hereby certify that I personally hand delivered an exact 
copy of the foregoing Boy and Beverly Campbells' Requested 
Visitation Schedule, to Defendant's Attorney, Dianne R. Balmain, 
this 17th day of September, 1993. 
L. Brent Hoggan 
(JU^%&>fy*c«^ 
S~7 
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Dianne R. Balmanin - 6174 
Attorney for Defendant 
110 North 100 East 
P.O. Box 543 
Logan, Utah 84323-0543 
Telephone: (801) 753-7400 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT FOR THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT, 
COUNTY OF CACHE, STATE OF UTAH 
BOYD & BONNIE CAMPBELL, * 
AFFIDAVIT FOR 
Plaintiff, * ATTORNEY'S FEES 
vs. * 
JANET CAMPBELL, * Case No. 
Defendant. * 
STATE OF UTAH : 
ss 
COUNTY OF CACHE: 
Dianne R. Balmain, being first duly sworn upon oath, deposes 
and states as follows: 
1. That I am an attorney licensed to practice in the State 
of Utah and have been retained by the above named Defendant to 
represent her in this action. 
2. That during the course of my representation of the 
Defendant in this action, the undersigned has rendered services as 
set forth in Exhibit A, attached hereto and by this reference made 
a part hereof, for and on behalf of the said Defendant. 
3. That the usual and customary rate of legal services of 
the type rendered herein is $65.00 per hour and brings the total 
for legal services rendered, based upon the outlined hours in 
Exhibit A, to date of $1,586.00. 
4. That in connection with this matter, I have incurred 
expenses as set forth in Exhibit B, attached hereto and by this 
reference made a part hereof, in the amount of $28.65. 
DATED this \ j d a v o f KaY> 1994. 
DXahne W/BalmaAr^ '^ U^- ^l\_ 
Attorney for Defendant 
•J 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this \ ? day of May, 1994 
DIANNE KARTCHNER 
/.- / r ^ c A NOmYPUBUC'STMEOFVTAH 
tti i~.Zttf\A no NORTH 100 EAST 
LOGAN, UTAH 84321 
COMM. EXP. NOV. 11,1997 
* I , / "! < *\ n 
Notary Public 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby give notice that I mailed a copy of the foregoing: 
AFFIDAVIT FOR ATTORNEY'S FEES and attached Exhibits A & B to the 
below named individuals on the day of May, 1994. 
Brent Hoggan 
HOGGAN & OLSON 
88 West Center 
P.O. Box 525 
Logan, UT 84323-0525 
1 1/IIM, I'.pni.i 'u I \ 
EXHIBIT "A" 
Hours Amount 
12/14/93 Review Documents Received. 
12/22/93 Review Rules of Appeal Procedure. 
01/03/94 Call to Court Reporter. 
01/05/94 Call from Client. 
01/11/94 Call from Client. 
01/18/94 Call from Client. 
Letter to Attorney Hoggan. 
01/26/94 Call from Janet. 
01/31/94 Call from Client. 
02/22/94 Call from Client regarding 
Visitation. 
03/05/94 Review Material Received 
from Janet. 
03/07/94 Review Material Received; 
Letter to Client. 
03/08/94 Review Material Received; 
Call to Janet; Letter to 
Attorny Hoggan. 
05/11/94 Call from Client. 
05/14/94 Draft Appellate Appeal Brief. 
05/15/94 Research. Draft Appellate Brief. 
05/16/94 Work on Brief. 
05/17/94 Work on Brief. 
05/18/94 Finish Brief, Prepare for Filing. 
(Estimate - Prepare for Oral 
Argument, Oral Argument, Travel) 
0.20 
0.30 
0.10 
0.10 
0.10 
0.10 
0.10 
0.10 
0.20 
0.10 
0.10 
0.10 
0.20 
0.10 
3.00 
3.50 
3.50 
4.00 
1.50 
13.00 
19.50 
6.50 
6.50 
6.50 
6.50 
6.50 
6.50 
13.00 
6.50 
6.50 
6.50 
13.00 
6.50 
195.00 
227.50 
227.50 
260.00 
97.50 
7.00 455.00 
BALANCE DUE 1.70 $1,586.00 
EXHIBIT "B' 
COSTS 
01/25/94 To Toni Frye for Transcript of OSC 
Hearing. $12.00 
To Rodney M. Felshaw for Transcript of 
Hearing. 16.65 
BALANCE DUE $27.65 
